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IT’S A LONG WAY FOR THE SHORTCUT: 
THE EVOLUTION OF NORTH DAKOTA RULE OF EVIDENCE 
707 AND ITS IMPACT ON DUI PROSECUTIONS 
CHERIE L. CLARK* AND REID A. BRADY** 
ABSTRACT 
 
Before adoption of Rule 707 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, 
North Dakota Century Code section 39-20-07 permitted a prosecutor to 
introduce at a DUI trial a blood test report without testimony from the 
person who tested the blood.  Rule 707 was created to remedy this violation 
of the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him.  When 
originally adopted, the Rule merely required the prosecutor to give notice of 
her intent to offer the blood test report, and the defendant could then 
demand the prosecutor produce at trial the person who authored the report.  
The Rule was later amended and now allows the defendant to identify the 
persons he demands the prosecutor produce at trial to testify about the 
report.  The potential persons a defendant may demand now includes the 
nurse who drew his blood, which is often burdensome on the State.  This 
Article focuses on the development of Rule 707 and its impact on DUI 
prosecutions.  The origin of Rule 707 – Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, – 
is discussed in Part II.  The adoption of the Rule is addressed in Part III.  
Part IV outlines the amendment of the Rule.  Part V discusses the impact of 
the amendment on DUI prosecutions and suggestions to reduce the costs of 
the amendment.  Finally, Part VI restates the need for prosecutors to adapt 
to the Rule. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Less than four years ago, the Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts1 ruled a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
confront adverse witnesses is violated when an analytical report is admitted 
into evidence without affording the defendant a right to confront the author 
of the report.2  At the time, several North Dakota statutes permitted what 
Melendez-Diaz prohibited.3  In the DUI context, which this Article will 
focus on, North Dakota Century Code section 39-20-07 permitted – without 
testimony from the lab analyst – admission of an analytical report to show 
the alcohol concentration of a driver’s blood.4  To remedy this 
constitutional defect, the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted North 
Dakota Rule of Evidence 707.5  Rule 707 created a notice-and-demand 
procedure endorsed in Melendez-Diaz.6  Under the procedure, a prosecutor 
would serve written notice of the state’s intent to offer an analytical report 
 
1. 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
2. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311. 
3. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03.1-37(5) (2009), 20.1-13.1-10(7), 20.1-15-11(9) (2012), 
39-20-07(9), 39-24.1-08(7) (Supp. 2011). 
4. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07 (Supp. 2011). 
5. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311; North Dakota Supreme Court Order of Adoption No. 
20090381 (Dec. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Order of Adoption No. 20090381], available at 
http://www ndcourts.gov/court/Notices/20090381/Order htm. 
6. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325-27; N.D. R. EVID. 707. 
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showing the alcohol concentration in the defendant’s blood at the time of 
driving.7  The defendant could then object by demanding the prosecutor 
present at trial the analyst who tested the defendant’s blood sample.8 
Since adoption, the North Dakota Supreme Court has amended Rule 
707 to allow a defendant to identify the person he or she demands the 
prosecution produce at trial.9  Under the existing rule, a defendant may 
demand the prosecution produce the person who drew a defendant’s blood – 
regardless of whether a law enforcement officer or other witness observed 
the drawing of the blood and could testify precisely how it was drawn.10  
Because the person who draws blood is often a registered nurse at a private 
hospital,11 the amendment has been costly. 
Following this brief introduction, Part II of this Article discusses the 
origin of the Rule:  Melendez-Diaz, a watershed Confrontation Clause case.  
Part III covers the North Dakota Supreme Court’s adoption of Rule 707.  
The amendment of the Rule – based on comments, Joint Procedure 
Committee meetings, and, in large part, the North Dakota Supreme Court’s 
independent acts – is outlined in Part IV.  Part V considers the impact of the 
Rule on DUI prosecutions – primarily the defendant’s authority to demand 
production of the nurse who drew a defendant’s blood – and suggests to 
prosecutors some methods for dealing with its costs.  Lastly, Part VI 
restates the need for prosecutors to adapt to the Rule. 
II. ORIGIN OF RULE 707:  MELENDEZ-DIAZ AND NOTICE-AND-
DEMAND STATUTES 
In its order adopting North Dakota Rule of Evidence 707, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court explained the Rule was a response to the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz.12  A review of 
Melendez-Diaz thus provides the framework for Rule 707’s birth.  In 
Melendez-Diaz, police received a tip that Thomas Wright was behaving 
suspiciously – repeatedly receiving phone calls at work; after each call, 
going to the front of the store and getting picked up by a blue sedan; and 
 
7. N.D. R. EVID. 707(a).  For a “per se” violation of the DUI statute, the sample must be 
obtained within two hours of a defendant’s operating or being in physical control of a vehicle.  
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (Supp. 2011). 
8. N.D. R. EVID. 707(b). 
9. Id.; Joint Procedure Committee Minutes 10-13 (Sept. 23-24, 2010) [hereinafter Sept. 2010 
Minutes]. 
10. State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf, 2012 ND 151, ¶ 15, 819 N.W.2d 546, 553. 
11. Telephone Interview with Sergeant William Ahlfeldt, Fargo Police Dep’t (Dec. 7, 2012).  
Sergeant Ahlfeldt estimated that he had taken DUI arrestees for blood tests approximately 450-
500 times during his career, and, in each case, the person who drew blood was a nurse. 
12. Order of Adoption No. 20090381, supra note 5. 
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returning a short time later.13  Police set up surveillance and observed 
Wright’s suspicious behavior.14  After Wright got out of the blue sedan 
upon his return, an officer searched him and found four bags containing a 
substance believed to be cocaine.15  Other officers then detained Luis 
Melendez-Diaz, who was one of two men in the blue sedan.16  Officers put 
Wright and the third man into a squad car.17  On the drive to the police 
station, officers observed the suspects “fidgeting” and making suspicious 
movements in the backseat of the squad car.18  Officers later searched the 
squad car, and found a bag containing nineteen small plastic bags hidden 
between the front and back seats.19  Those nineteen bags found in the car 
and the four bags found in Wright’s possession were sent to a state lab for 
testing.20 
Melendez-Diaz was charged with distributing and trafficking cocaine.21  
At trial, the prosecutor offered as evidence state lab analysts’ certificates 
showing the results of the testing of the bags.22  The certificates reported the 
weight of the bags, and that the substance found in the bags was cocaine.23  
The certificates were sworn to, before a notary, by the analysts.24  
Melendez-Diaz objected to the admission of the certificates, arguing his 
constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses required the analysts to 
testify in person.25  Melendez-Diaz’s objection was overruled, and the 
certificates were admitted.26  Melendez-Diaz was found guilty, and he 
appealed.27  He argued admission of the certificates violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.28  After the state 
appellate court affirmed, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.29 
 
13. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308 (2009). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 309. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
          
2012] IT’S A LONG WAY FOR THE SHORTCUT 325 
At the outset, the Supreme Court identified the issue:  whether the 
analysts’ affidavits were “testimonial,” rendering the analysts witnesses 
subject to the defendant’s right to confront under the Sixth Amendment.30  
Citing Crawford v. Washington,31 the Court emphasized that the 
Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment “guarantees a defendant’s 
right to confront those who bear testimony against him,” and a witness’s 
testimony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness 
appears at trial, or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.32 
Explaining what is considered testimony (i.e., a testimonial statement) 
under the Confrontation Clause, the Court reviewed the description it 
previously gave: 
Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements 
exist:  ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent – 
that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior 
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or 
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect 
to be used prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements . . . contained 
in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, 
prior testimony, or confessions; statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably 
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 
trial.33 
Using this description, the Court found the certificates were testimonial 
statements.34  Indeed, the certificates were “quite plainly affidavits” and 
“functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, ‘doing precisely what a 
 
30. Id. at 307. 
31. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
32. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
33. Id. at 310 (emphasis in original) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 
(2004)). 
34. Id.  After Melendez-Diaz, the Court encountered a similar issue in Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).  The issue was whether the Confrontation Clause allows a 
prosecutor to introduce a lab report containing a testimonial certification – made for purposes of 
proving a DUI defendant’s blood alcohol concentration – through the courtroom testimony of a 
scientist who did not certify, conduct, or observe the actual test reported in the certification.  Id. at 
2710.  An analyst named Caylor tested Bullcoming’s blood and issued the certification of the 
results.  Id. at 2710-11.  Caylor did not testify at trial, and instead another analyst testified about 
Caylor’s certification.  Id. at 2712.  The Court reasoned that the right to confront is not satisfied 
when a surrogate or substitute witness testifies about another’s statements.  Id. at 2715-16.  “In 
short, when the State elected to introduce Caylor’s certification, Caylor became a witness 
Bullcoming had the right to confront.”  Id. at 2716. 
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witness does on direct examination.’”35  As a result, the Court concluded 
that unless the analysts were unavailable and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine them, the defendant was entitled to confront 
the analysts at trial.36 
Explaining the Sixth Amendment contemplates only two classes of 
witnesses, the Court identified “[(1)] those against the defendant and [(2)] 
those in his favor.”37  The prosecution must produce the latter (under the 
Confrontation Clause), and the defendant may call the former (under the 
Compulsory Process Clause).38  “[T]here is not a third category of 
witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune from 
confrontation.”39 
The Court, appropriately, indicated in an oft-cited footnote that even 
chain of custody testimony offered by a prosecutor must be introduced live 
if the defendant objects.40  Although the footnote’s first sentence is often 
relied upon for the conclusion that chain of custody testimony is immune 
from the Confrontation Clause, such a conclusion ignores the remainder of 
the footnote.  The first sentence provides, “we do not hold, and it is not the 
case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing chain of 
custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must 
appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case.”41  However, that does 
not mean testimonial42 statements from chain of custody witnesses are 
admissible without in-court testimony.  Indeed, the remaining sentences 
clarify the first sentence.43  They show that “gaps in the chain [of custody] 
 
35. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310-11 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 
(2006)). 
36. Id. at 311. 
37. Id. at 313. 
38. Id. at 313-14. 
39. Id. at 314. 
40. Id. at 311 n.1. 
41. Id. 
42. When discussing chain of custody statements and what must be introduced live, the 
Court focused on “testimony.”  Id.  Of course, while some chain of custody statements will be 
testimonial, others will be nontestimonial.  For instance, a person’s statements, on a form 
expressly designated for use in a DUI case, that a blood sample was sent or received likely would 
be testimonial.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (providing “statements 
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe 
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial” are testimonial) (citations omitted).  
On the other hand, regularly kept postal records showing that a package was mailed by a police 
department to the state lab likely would be nontestimonial.  See id. 
43. The North Dakota Supreme Court has cited the footnote in several recent decisions.  See 
State ex rel. Madden v. Rustad, 2012 ND 242, ¶ 11, 837 N.W.2d 767, 771; State v. Lutz, 2012 ND 
156, ¶ 9, 820 N.W.2d 111, 114; State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf, 2012 ND 151, ¶ 9, 819 N.W.2d 
546, 550; State v. Gietzen, 2010 ND 82, ¶ 3, 786 N.W.2d 1, 6-7. 
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normally go to the weight of evidence rather than its admissibility[,]”44 and 
that “[it] is up to the prosecution to decide what steps in the chain of 
custody are so crucial as to require evidence . . . .”45  And most importantly, 
“what testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be introduced 
live.”46 
Despite the prosecution’s duty to produce the witnesses47 offering 
evidence against a defendant, the Court noted one exception:48  notice-and-
demand statutes.49  Such statutes “require the prosecution to provide notice 
to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at trial, 
after which the defendant is given a period of time in which he may object 
to the admission of the evidence absent the analyst’s appearance live at 
trial.”50  Justifying the exception, the Court indicated a defendant “always 
 
44. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n.1 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Lolt, 
854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir. 1988)).  The North Dakota Supreme Court has followed that principle.  
See State v. Huffman, 542 N.W.2d 718, 721 (N.D. 1996) (“The State need not prove an ‘unbroken 
chain of custody’ before physical evidence can be admitted at trial.”); State v. Haugen, 448 
N.W.2d 191, 196 (N.D. 1989); State v. Bohe, 447 N.W.2d 277, 279 (N.D. 1989); State v. 
Hartsoch, 329 N.W.2d 367, 370 (N.D. 1983); see also State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 789 
(N.D. 1982) (indicating the trial court “must be satisfied that, in all reasonable probability, the 
item offered is the same as the item seized and is substantially unchanged in condition[,]” “that it 
is reasonably probable that tampering or substitution did not occur[,]” and that “[c]ontrary 
speculation may well affect the weight of the evidence accorded it by the factfinder but does not 
affect its admissibility”); State v. Berger, 285 N.W.2d 533, 540 (N.D. 1979); State v. Lange, 255 
N.W.2d 59, 66 (N.D. 1977). 
45. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n.1.  The Court did distinguish from chain of custody 
witnesses with testimonial evidence, “documents prepared in the regular course of equipment 
maintenance [, which] may well qualify as nontestimonial records.”  Id. 
46. Id. (emphasis in original). 
47. Three years after Melendez-Diaz, the Court gave instruction on who is considered a 
witness in the context of DNA testing.  See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2240 (2012).  
The issue in Williams was whether the Confrontation Clause barred “an expert from expressing an 
opinion based on facts about a case that have been made known to the expert but about which the 
expert is not competent to testify.”  Id. at 2227.  An expert testified that she produced a DNA 
profile from a sample of the defendant’s blood that matched the profile that a separate lab 
produced from semen found on vaginal swabs of the sexual assault victim, and no witness from 
the separate lab testified.  Id. at 2229-30.  The Court concluded that the Confrontation Clause did 
not bar the expert’s testimony for two independent reasons.  Id. at 2228.  First, the expert referred 
to the separate lab report not to prove the truth of the matter in that report but to establish that the 
report contained a DNA profile that matched the DNA profile developed from the defendant’s 
blood.  Id. at 2235, 2240 (recognizing that the Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of 
testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted”).  
Second, even if the separate lab report had been offered for its truth, it was not prepared for the 
primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual, i.e., a testimonial purpose.  Id. at 2243. 
48. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326.  The Court did not characterize these statutes as an 
“exception” to the rule requiring the prosecutor to produce at trial the witnesses against a 
defendant.  Id. 
49. Id. at 325-27.  The Court cited multiple examples of notice-and-demand statutes.  Id. at 
326-27 (referencing GA. CODE ANN § 35-3-154.1 (2006); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., ART. 
38.41, § 4 (Vernon 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51(C) (Lexis 2006)); see also MINN. 
STAT. § 634(15)(2)(b) (2012). 
50. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326. 
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has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause objection; notice-and-
demand statutes simply govern the time within which he must do so.”51 
III. ADOPTION OF RULE 707 
A few months after Melendez-Diaz was decided, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court ordered that Rule 707 be adopted, effective February 1, 
2010, subject to a comment period.52  In the adopting order, the court 
reasoned “Melendez-Diaz held that analysts’ certificates of analysis were 
testimonial statements, and the analysts [thus] were witnesses for Sixth 
Amendment confrontation purposes[;]” that “a defendant’s ability to 
subpoena the analyst under state law did not abrogate the state’s obligation 
to produce the analyst for cross-examination[;]” and that the use of notice-
and-demand statutes was acceptable.53  Furthermore, several statutes – 
including North Dakota Century Code sections 19-03.1-37(5),54 20.1-13.1-
10(7),55 20.1-15-11(9),56 39-20-07(9),57 and 39-24.1-08(7)58 – were 
 
51. Id. at 327 (emphasis in original). 
52. Order of Adoption, No. 20090381, supra note 5. 
53. Id. 
54. This subdivision relates to drug and drug paraphernalia prosecutions and provides that an 
indigent defendant may subpoena “the director or an employee of the state crime laboratory . . . .”  
N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-37(5) (2009).  North Dakota Century Code subdivision 19-03.1-37(4) 
would have violated a defendant’s right to confront.  It provides that “a certified copy of the 
analytical report signed by the director or the director’s designee must be accepted as prima facie 
evidence of the results of the analytical findings.”  Id. § 19-03.1-37(4).  Providing an indigent 
defendant the ability to subpoena a state crime laboratory employee could coexist with a notice-
and-demand statute.  For instance, a defendant could decide after his demand deadline that he 
wished to question an analyst or he could strategically believe that it would be more persuasive, to 
present the evidence through a state criminal laboratory employee rather than during cross-
examination of the employee. 
55. This subdivision relates to operating a boat while under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
and provides that an indigent defendant may subpoena “the individual who conducted the 
chemical test” to determine the alcohol or drug concentration of the defendant’s blood, breath, or 
urine.  N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 20.1-13.1-10(7), 20.1-13.1-01 (2012) (outlining the purpose of 
testing under N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 20.1-13.1 and identifying the bodily fluids that can be tested).  
North Dakota Century Code subdivision 20.1-13.1-10(3) would have violated a defendant’s right 
to confront.  It provides that “[t]he results of the chemical test must be received in evidence when 
it is shown that the sample was properly obtained and the test was fairly administered . . . .”  Id. § 
20.1-13.1-10(3).  Subdivision 6 – which provides that a certified copy of the analytical report must 
be accepted as prima facie evidence – would have also violated a defendant’s right to confront.  
Id. § 20.1-13.1-10(6). 
56. This subdivision relates to hunting while under the influence of alcohol or drugs and 
provides that an indigent defendant may subpoena “the individual who conducted the chemical 
test” to determine the alcohol or drug concentration of the defendant’s blood, breath, or urine.  
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 20.1-15-11(9), 20.1-15-01 (outlining the purpose of testing under N.D. 
CENT. CODE ch. 20.1-15 and identifying the bodily fluids that can be tested).  North Dakota 
Century Code subdivision 20.1-15-11(5) would have violated a defendant’s right to confront.  It 
provides that “[t]he results of the chemical test must be received in evidence when it is shown that 
the sample was properly obtained and the test was fairly administered . . . .”  Id. § 20.1-15-11(5).  
Subdivision 8 – which provides that a certified copy of the analytical report must be accepted as 
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constitutionally suspect, because they merely allowed a defendant to 
subpoena an analyst but did not require the state to produce the analyst to 
testify.59 
To remedy the constitutional concerns, the Rule provided a notice-and-
demand procedure.60  The prosecution, accordingly, had to give notice of its 
intent to offer at trial an analytical report under any of the statutes.61  If the 
 
prima facie evidence – would have also violated a defendant’s right to confront.  Id. § 20.1-15-
11(8). 
57. This subdivision relates to DUI prosecutions and provides that an indigent defendant may 
subpoena “the individual who conducted the chemical analysis” to determine the alcohol or drug 
concentration of the defendant’s blood, breath, or urine.  N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-20-07(9), 39-
20-01 (Supp. 2011) (outlining the purpose of testing under N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 39-20 and 
identifying the bodily fluids that can be tested).  North Dakota Century Code subdivision 39-20-
07(5) would have violated a defendant’s right to confront.  It provides that “[t]he results of the 
chemical analysis must be received in evidence when it is shown that the sample was properly 
obtained and the test was fairly administered . . . .”  Subdivision 8 – which provides that a certified 
copy of the analytical report must be accepted as prima facie evidence – would have also violated 
a defendant’s right to confront.  Id. § 39-20-07(8). 
58. This subdivision relates to snowmobiling while under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
and provides that an indigent defendant may subpoena “the individual who conducted the 
chemical test” to determine the alcohol or drug concentration of the defendant’s blood, breath, or 
urine.  N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-24.1-08(7), 39-24.1-01 (outlining the purpose of testing under 
N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 39-24.1 and identifying the bodily fluids that can be tested).  North Dakota 
Century Code subdivision 39-24.1-08(3) would have violated a defendant’s right to confront.  It 
provides that “[t]he results of the chemical test must be received in evidence when it is shown that 
the sample was properly obtained and the test was fairly administered . . . .”  Id. § 39-24.1-08(3).  
Subdivision 6 – which provides that a certified copy of the analytical report must be accepted as 
prima facie evidence – would have also violated a defendant’s right to confront.  Id. § 39-24.1-
08(6). 
59. Id. 
60. The full text of the originally adopted rule was as follows: 
 
RULE 707.  ANALYTICAL REPORT ADMISSION; 
CONFRONTATION 
 
(a) Notification to Defendant. If the prosecution intends to introduce an analytical 
report issued under N.D.C.C. chapters 19-03.1, 19-03.2, 19-03.4, 20.1-13.1, 20.1-15, 
39-06.2, or 39-20 in a criminal trial, it must notify the defendant or the defendant's 
attorney of its intent to introduce the report at least 30 days before the trial. 
 
(b) Objection. At least 10 days before the trial, the defendant may object in writing to 
the introduction of the report. If objection is made, the prosecutor must produce the 
person who prepared the report to testify at the trial. If the witness is not available to 
testify, the court must grant a continuance. 
 
(c) Waiver. If the defendant does not timely object to the introduction of the report, 
the defendant's right to confront the person who prepared the report is waived and the 
report, if otherwise admissible, must be accepted as prima facie evidence of the results 
contained in the report. 
 
N.D. R. EVID. 707(a) (2010), available at http://www ndcourts.gov/court/Notices/20090381/ 
Rule707.ev htm. 
61. Id. 
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defendant timely objected, the prosecution would have to produce “the 
person who prepared the report” to testify at trial.62  For analytical tests 
conducted at the North Dakota State Crime Lab, the person who prepared 
the report was, and continues to be, the analyst who tested the sample at 
issue.63  So under the originally adopted rule, the only person that a 
defendant could demand produced for trial was the analyst who tested the 
sample.64 
IV. AMENDMENT OF RULE 707 
When the Rule was originally adopted, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court ordered it “effective February 1, 2010, subject to a comment 
period.”65  Comments were due one month later.66  Attorney Tom Tuntland 
submitted comments and raised concerns “in two principal areas, namely 
timing and modification of substantive law.”67  Emphasizing the Rule only 
required the prosecution to give thirty days’ notice of its intent to offer an 
analytical report, Tuntland asserted the Rule would force a defendant to 
choose between his right to a speedy trial and his right to confront the 
analyst.68  Thus he recommended the deadline for the prosecution’s notice 
be changed to an earlier date.69  Tuntland also recommended the Rule be 
amended to omit the language indicating the “unobjected to” report must be 
accepted as prima facie evidence of the results.70  Tuntland argued the Rule 
should address only the admissibility of the analytical report, not the effect 
(prima facie evidence) of the report.71 
Besides Tuntland, the North Dakota Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (NDACDL) submitted comments.72  The NDACDL indicated its 
concerns about the Rule were threefold:  “(1) it appears to procedurally and 
substantively favor the State; (2) it was not subjected to the normal judicial 
 
62. Id. 
63. Telephone Interview with Hope Olson, Dir., Crime Lab. Div., Office of Attorney Gen. 
(Nov. 29, 2012). 
64. See N.D. R. EVID. 707(b) (2010). 
65. Order of Adoption No. 20090381, supra note 5. 
66. Id. 
67. E-mail from Tom Tuntland, J.D., to Andrew Forward, J.D., Office of Clerk of N.D. 
Supreme Court (Feb. 2, 2010) (on file with author). 
68. Id. 
69. Id.  Tuntland suggested using the same deadline as the one for pre-trial motions.  Id. 
70. Id. (referencing N.D. R. EVID. 707(c) (2010)). 
71. Id. 
72. Letter from Michael R. Hoffman, President, N.D. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, to 
Penny L. Miller, Clerk of the Supreme Court (Feb. 25, 2010) (on file with author).  Hoffman 
signed the letter containing the comments, and forty-seven other lawyers, including Tuntland, 
electronically endorsed the letter.  Id. 
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rulemaking process; and (3) it raises substantive, constitutional concerns 
under the Sixth Amendment.”73  Outlining its first concern, the NDACDL 
pointed out that the Rule did not require the prosecution to provide its 
notice in writing and did not establish a remedy if the prosecution failed to 
provide proper notice.74  The NDACL, like Tuntland, also asserted the Rule 
would unfairly establish the analytical report results as prima facie 
evidence, and infringe on defendants’ rights to a speedy trial.75  On its 
second concern, the NDACDL emphasized that the Rule was adopted by 
the court sua sponte without input from the Joint Procedure Committee.76  
The NDACDL recommended the Joint Procedure Committee be involved in 
the process of adopting the Rule.77  Addressing its third concern, the 
NDACDL indicated its concern “can be simplified [to] stating that 
‘subpoena statutes’ or ‘notice-and-demand statutes’ improperly circumvent 
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses in a criminal trial.”78 
The NDACDL’s and Tuntland’s comments were the only ones 
submitted during the comment period.  Based on the comments, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court proposed amendments to the Rule.  The proposed 
amendments required the prosecution’s notice to be in writing and 
eliminated the prima facie effect of admission of the analytical report.79  
 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id.  Two attorneys, Robert G. Hoy and Bruce D. Quick, electronically endorsed the 
NDACDL comments and were also members of the Joint Procedure Committee.  Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id.  The NDACDL cited Melendez-Diaz but argued its principles on notice-and-demand 
statutes were dicta.  Id. 
79. The proposed amendments, in their entirety, were as follows: 
 
RULE 707.  ANALYTICAL REPORT ADMISSION; 
CONFRONTATION 
 
(a) Notification to Defendant. If the prosecution intends to introduce an analytical 
report issued under N.D.C.C. chapters chs. 19-03.1, 19-03.2, 19-03.4, 20.1-13.1, 20.1-
15, 39-06.2, or 39-20 in a criminal trial, it must notify the defendant or the defendant's 
attorney in writing of its intent to introduce the report at least 30 days before the trial. 
The prosecution must also serve a copy of the report on the defendant or the 
defendant's attorney. 
 
(b) Objection. At least 10 14 days before the trial, the defendant may object in writing 
to the introduction of the report. If objection is made, the prosecutor must produce the 
person who prepared the report to testify at the trial. If the witness is not available to 
testify, the court must grant a continuance. 
 
(c) Waiver. If the defendant does not timely object to the introduction of the report, 
the defendant's right to confront the person who prepared the report is waived and the 
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The court also requested that the Joint Procedure Committee review the 
proposed amendments.80 
At its September 2010 meeting, the Joint Procedure Committee 
reviewed the proposed amendments,81 which the committee later adopted.82  
The committee also recommended two additional amendments:  (1) ensure 
the Rule applied not just to criminal trials but also to juvenile delinquency 
proceedings83 and (2) require the prosecution to serve the analytical report 
at least thirty days before trial.84  At one point, a committee member 
commented “the state may be required to produce multiple witnesses in 
some cases, as defense attorneys have argued that everyone involved with 
filling out the report should be made available for cross examination.”85  
But neither that member nor any other member recommended changing the 
provision requiring the prosecutor to produce “the person who prepared the 
report . . . .”86 
Three months after the Joint Procedure Committee meeting, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court also ordered the adoption of the committee’s 
proposed amendments, with some changes by the court, effective March 1, 
2011.87  The court’s further amendments included significant ones to the 
objection section – adding the defendant’s power to identify the witness to 
testify about the analytical report and, accordingly, changing the 
prosecution’s duty to produce the person identified, rather than the person 
who prepared the report.88  The amended objection section thus provided 
that “the defendant may object in writing to the introduction of the report 
and identify the name or job title of the witness to be produced to testify 
 
report, if otherwise admissible, must be accepted as prima facie evidence of the results 
contained in the report. 
 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 707 OF THE NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF EVIDENCE, 
http://www ndcourts.gov/court/JP/Agendas/Sep2010/Rule.707.ev htm [hereinafter Amendments 
Rule 707]. 
80. Sept. 2010 Minutes, supra note 9, at 10. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 13. 
83. Id. at 12.  The specific recommendation was to amend section (a) by adding “or juvenile 
delinquency proceeding” after the existing phrase “criminal trial.”  Id. 
84. Id. at 12-13.  The specific recommendation was to amend section (a) by adding the 
phrase “must also serve a copy of the report on the defendant or the defendant’s attorney” after the 
existing phrase “intent to introduce the report.”  Id. 
85. Id. at 11. 
86. Id. at 10-13; Amendments Rule 707, supra note 79. 
87. Order of Adoption No. 20090381, http://www ndcourts.gov/court/Notices/20090381/ 
order2 htm [hereinafter Amended Order of Adoption No. 20090381]. 
88. Id. 
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about the report at trial” and “[i]f objection is made, the prosecutor must 
produce the person requested.”89 
V. IMPACT OF AMENDMENT ON DUI PROSECUTIONS 
The amendments to Rule 707 have been costly on DUI prosecutions in 
one major way:  requiring the prosecution to produce at trial the person who 
drew a defendant’s blood90 – often a registered nurse from a private 
hospital.91  First, this Part provides some background about DUI 
prosecutions to help illustrate the impact of Melendez-Diaz and Rule 707.  
After generally explaining DUI prosecutions in North Dakota, Section B of 
this Part explains the process of DUI prosecutions prior to the court creating 
and amending Rule 707.  Section C explains the process after the 
amendments, leading to the increased costs explained in Section D.  Finally, 
Section E provides several solutions to reduce the costliness of DUI 
prosecution in North Dakota. 
A. DUI PROSECUTIONS GENERALLY 
In a DUI prosecution in North Dakota, proving the alcohol 
concentration in a driver’s body is very important.92  Indeed, unless the 
prosecution relies on a “non per se” provision93 (i.e., a driver was simply 
too impaired to drive safely), an alcohol concentration of at least .08% (a 
“per se” violation) is an essential element that must be proven beyond 
reasonable doubt.94  An alcohol concentration is determined by obtaining a 
defendant’s blood or breath sample.95  When a blood sample is sought,96 a 
law enforcement officer typically takes an arrestee to a hospital and seeks 
an individual medically qualified to draw blood.97  That individual is often a 
 
89. N.D. R. EVID. 707(b) (2011). 
90. State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf, 2012 ND 151, ¶ 15, 819 N.W.2d 546, 553. 
91. Telephone Interview with Sergeant William Ahlfeldt, supra note 11. 
92. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(1)(a) (Supp. 2011). 
93. “Non per se” provisions prohibit a person from driving when he is “under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor[,]” when he is “under the influence of any drug or substance or combination 
of drugs or substances to a degree which renders [him] incapable of safely driving[,]” and when he 
is “under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drugs or substances to a degree which 
render [him] incapable of safely driving.”  See id. § 39-08-01(1)(b)-(d). 
94. Id. § 39-08-01(1)(a). 
95. See id. § 39-20-01 (identifying potential chemical tests of “the blood, breath, or urine”).  
Although the statute provides for the testing of urine, the state crime lab rarely conducts tests to 
determine the alcohol concentration from urine.  Telephone Interview with Charles E. Eder, N.D. 
State Toxicologist (Dec. 21, 2012). 
96. The officer has discretion to choose whether a blood, breath, or urine sample is sought.  
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01. 
97. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-02 (“The director of the state crime laboratory or the 
director’s designee shall determine the qualifications or credentials for being medically qualified 
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nurse.98  For sake of efficiency in this Article, “nurse” will be used 
interchangeably with “individual medically qualified to draw blood.” 
In drawing blood, the nurse should99 follow an approved method100 – a 
procedure designated by the state toxicologist.101  The approved method is 
set out in a document entitled “Form 104.”102  It provides the following 
checklist for the nurse as specimen collector:  “used an intact kit; observed 
powder in vacutainer tube; used disinfectant provided in kit; used needle, 
guide and tube provided in kit; [and] drew blood into tube and inverted 
several times.”103  As the nurse draws blood, the officer is present104 and 
usually observes as the nurse draws the blood.105  Once the nurse has drawn 
the blood, the officer follows Form 104’s approved method for packaging it 
and sends it to the state lab for testing.106 
 
to draw blood, and shall issue a list of approved designations including medical doctor and 
registered nurse.”).  The state toxicologist, as the state crime laboratory director’s designee, lists 
the approved designations of individuals medically qualified to draw blood as follows:  clinical 
laboratory scientist, clinical laboratory technician, medical doctor, medical laboratory scientist, 
medical laboratory technician, medical technician, nurse practitioner, osteopathic physician and 
surgeon, physician assistant, certified physician assistant, registered nurse, and other designations 
covered in North Dakota Century Code section 43-17-01 of the “Physicians and Surgeons” 
chapter.  Aff. of Charles E. Eder, N.D. State Toxicologist (Sept. 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.ag nd.gov/CrimeLab/BloodAlcoholProgram/MeciallyQualIndviduals/09-29-11.pdf. 
98. Telephone Interview with Sergeant William Ahlfeldt, supra note 11. 
99. If the nurse does not follow the approved method, expert testimony may be used to show 
the blood test was still accurate.  See infra discussion Part V.E. 
100. The “approved method” is the term used for the scientific processes designated by the 
state crime lab director or the director’s designee for analyzing samples.  Telephone Interview 
with Mark A. Friese, Attorney-At-Law, Vogel Law Firm (Mar. 21, 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-
20-07(5).  The term, though, has been sometimes expanded to include other designated 
procedures.  See City of West Fargo v. Hawkins, 200 ND 168, ¶ 3, 616 N.W.2d 856, 857 (noting a 
registered nurse “had drawn the blood in accordance with the State Toxicologist’s approved 
method”); State v. Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d 878, 881 (N.D. 1993) (referring to a blood sample 
“drawn according to the method approved by the State Toxicologist”).  This Article uses the 
expanded definition of “approved method” to include the state toxicologist’s designated 
procedures for nonscientific processes. 
101. The state toxicologist acts as the state crime laboratory director’s designee.  See N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 39-20-07(5). 
102. See State v. Schwalk, 430 N.W.2d 317, 322 (N.D. 1988) (explaining the state 
toxicologist “drafted From 104 to be used when a blood sample is drawn for blood alcohol 
testing”). 
103. Submission for Blood (104) (capitalization and boxes omitted). 
104. Telephone Interview with Sergeant William Ahlfeldt, supra note 11.  Because the 
defendant has been arrested and is considered a prisoner, the officer must ensure that the 
defendant is kept in law enforcement’s custody.  Id. 
105. Id. 
106. The state toxicologist provides the following checklist as the approved method for the 
specimen submitter: 
used an intact kit; affixed completed specimen label/seal over the top and down the 
sides of the blood tube; placed the blood tube inside the blood tube protector and then 
place it in the plastic bag provided (do not remove liquid absorbing sheet); placed the 
plastic bag and completed top portion of this form in the kit box and closed it; [and] 
affixed tamper-evident kit box shipping seal on kit box. 
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After testing, North Dakota Century Code section 39-20-07 provides a 
streamlined process – often referred to as the “shortcut”107 – for admission 
of the results into evidence.  Using the shortcut, the prosecutor must show 
that the sample was properly obtained and the test was fairly 
administered.108  Form 104 can be used to show “fair administration, chain 
of custody, and compliance with the State Toxicologist’s approved 
methods.”109  In addition to providing the approved methods for the nurse to 
draw blood and the officer to package it, Form 104 includes sections for the 
officer, the nurse, and the “specimen receiver” (an intake person at the state 
lab) to complete.110  The nurse’s section of Form 104 contains space for the 
time and date the blood was obtained, and for other remarks.111  It also has a 
space where the nurse signs and certifies the nurse “withdrew the blood 
specimen from the [defendant] and the information in this section is true 
and correct.”112 
B. DUI PROSECUTIONS PRE-AMENDMENT 
Before the amendments to Rule 707, DUI prosecutions remained 
relatively streamlined – with or without Form 104.  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court repeatedly recognized that an officer’s testimony could 
overcome the failure to introduce a complete Form 104.113 
In Schlosser v. North Dakota Department of Transportation,114 the 
court encountered a case involving a “failure to introduce Form 104 into 
 
Submission for Blood (104) (capitalization and boxes omitted). 
107. State ex rel. Madden v. Rustad, 2012 ND 242, ¶ 11, 837 N.W.2d 767, 773; State v. 
Lutz, 2012 ND 156, ¶ 13, 820 N.W.2d 111, 116; Schlosser v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND 
173, ¶ 10, 775 N.W.2d 695, 698. 
108. State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf, 2012 ND 151, ¶ 12, 819 N.W.2d 546, 552 (citing 
Schlosser v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND 173, ¶ 9, 775 N.W.2d 695, 698).  The prosecutor 
must also show that the method and devices used in testing the sample were approved by the state 
toxicologist and that the blood test was performed by an authorized person.  Id. (citing Schlosser 
v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND 173, ¶ 9, 775 N.W.2d 695, 698). 
109. State v. Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d 878, 881 (N.D. 1993). 
110. See Submission for Blood (Form 104); State Form No. 50491 (Mar. 2009). 
111. Submission for Blood (Form 104). 
112. Id.; see also State v. Friedt, 2007 ND 108, ¶ 3, 735 N.W.2d 848, 849-50 (providing that 
on Form 104, the nurse “marked that she used an intact blood sample kit; used the disinfectant, 
needle, guide, and blood tube provided in the blood sample kit; observed powder in the blood 
tube; and drew blood into the blood tube and inverted the blood tube several times[;] . . . recorded 
the date and time she drew [the defendant’s] blood and signed the form”). 
113. See Friedt, ¶¶ 11-13, 735 N.W.2d at 849-55; Schlosser v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 
ND 173, ¶¶ 11-13, 775 N.W.2d 695, 698-99; State v. Skarsgard, 2007 ND 160, ¶¶ 12-13, 739 
N.W.2d 786, 792; Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d at 881; McNamara v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 500 
N.W.2d 585, 590 (N.D. 1993). 
114. 2009 ND 173, 775 N.W.2d 695.  Although Schlosser was not a criminal case, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court has recently relied on it in criminal cases.  See State ex rel. Roseland v. 
Herauf, 2012 ND 151, ¶ 14, 819 N.W.2d 546, 552-93. 
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evidence.”115  The court explained that “[w]hile introducing Form 104 is a 
shortcut to show fair administration, chain of custody, and compliance with 
the approved method, this Court has previously allowed an officer’s 
testimony to overcome the failure to introduce a complete Form 104.”116  
The court reviewed the officer’s testimony.117  Characterizing it as 
“conclusory and perfunctory,” the court indicated the officer failed to 
establish that he and the nurse followed all the steps listed on Form 104 
while collecting a blood sample from a DUI arrestee.118  At the end of its 
opinion, the court again summarized that “[w]hile testimony can overcome 
the failure to submit a completed Form 104, the testimony in this case is 
insufficient.”119 
In State v. Jordheim,120 the court indicated that an officer’s testimony 
can be used to establish that the approved method in Form 104 was 
followed.121  The bottom half of Form 104 (the specimen submitter section) 
was not offered by the prosecution in Jordheim.122  But the officer who 
arrested the defendant for DUI testified that he performed the steps set out 
on Form 104.123  The court explained “this testimony, coupled with the 
documentary exhibits, established fair administration through scrupulous 
compliance with Form 104.”124 
In State v. Friedt,125 the court rejected a defendant’s contention that the 
prosecution must produce at trial the nurse who drew the defendant’s 
blood.126  Instead, the court ruled that the prosecution could rely upon a law 
enforcement officer who observed the nurse draw the blood.127  The court 
emphasized that the officer “personally observed the blood draw by the 
registered nurse, and based on his personal observations, he was able to 
testify how [the defendant’s] blood was obtained.”128  The court, 
accordingly, concluded that the officer’s testimony “showed that [the 
defendant’s] blood was properly obtained[.]”129  The ruling in Friedt, 
 
115. Schlosser, ¶ 1, 775 N.W.2d at 696. 
116. Id. ¶ 11, 775 N.W.2d at 699. 
117. Id. ¶ 3, 775 N.W.2d at 696-97. 
118. Id. ¶ 13, 775 N.W.2d at 699. 
119. Id. 
120. 508 N.W.2d 878 (N.D. 1993). 
121. Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d at 882. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. (citing McNamara v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 500 N.W.2d 585, 590 (N.D. 1993)). 
125. 2007 ND 108, 735 N.W.2d 848. 
126. Friedt, ¶¶ 11-13, 735 N.W.2d at 849-55. 
127. Id. ¶ 13, 735 N.W.2d at 855. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
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however, went further.  Indeed, the court indicated that the officer’s 
testimony “laid the foundation for the admission of Form 104[,]” which, of 
course, included the nurse’s statements.130 
Repeatedly citing Friedt, the court in State v. Gietzen131 again rejected 
a defendant’s contention that the prosecution must produce at trial the nurse 
who drew the defendant’s blood.132  Unlike Friedt, the officer in Gietzen 
did not establish that the nurse properly obtained the defendant’s blood.133  
So the court had to look elsewhere for “the foundation for [the defendant’s] 
chemical analysis . . . .”134  The court turned to Form 104.135  Emphasizing 
the streamlined procedure under North Dakota Century Code section 39-20-
07(5), the court concluded that Form 104 established that the defendant’s 
blood sample was properly obtained.136 
In making its conclusion, the court rejected the defendant’s argument 
that his right to confrontation was violated by the admission of Form 104, 
because he was not allowed to cross-examine the nurse whose statements 
were included in the form.137  The court viewed Melendez-Diaz as 
clarifying a defendant’s right to confront merely lab analysts.138  The court 
cited the famous footnote in Melendez-Diaz, which indicates the Court was 
not holding that “anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing 
the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing 
device must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case.”139  The 
court reasoned that the statements of the nurse “fall squarely within 
footnote one because they serve the evidentiary function of establishing the 
propriety of [the defendant’s] blood draw, not the conclusory function of 
establishing [the defendant’s] blood-alcohol concentration . . . .”140  Under 
this reasoning, evidence providing foundation for admission of the lab 
results was not testimonial, while evidence directly proving an element of a 
crime was testimonial.141 
 
130. Id. 
131. 2010 ND 82, 786 N.W.2d 1. 
132. Gietzen, ¶¶ 13-18, 786 N.W.2d at 5-7. 
133. Id. ¶ 15, 786 N.W.2d at 5-6. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. ¶ 18, 786 N.W.2d at 7. 
137. Id. ¶ 16, 786 N.W.2d at 6. 
138. Id. ¶ 17. 
139. Id. (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 (2009)). 
140. Id.  This reasoning was supported by case law in other jurisdictions.  See 
Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 921 N.E.2d 968, 975 n.15 (Mass. 2010). 
141. Lutz, 2012 ND 156, 820 N.W.2d 111; Rustad, 2012 ND 424, 837 N.W.2d 767. 
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C. DUI PROSECUTIONS POST-AMENDMENT 
After Rule 707 was amended, three cases sprung up.  Two limited the 
persons whom the prosecution needed to produce at trial.  In one, State ex 
rel. Madden v. Rustad,142 the court ruled a defendant could not require the 
prosecutor produce at trial the State Crime Lab Director.143  The court 
explained that no provision required the Director to make testimonial 
statements in the prima facie evidence authorized under the shortcuts of 
North Dakota Century Code section 39-20-07 and that the Director’s 
anticipated testimony would not prove the blood sample was properly 
drawn or the “substance of the results of the analytical report . . . .”144 
In the other case, State v. Lutz,145 the court concluded that the 
prosecution need not produce either the analyst who prepared the volatiles 
solution used by another analyst in conducting the chemical test or mail 
carriers or evidence custodians involved in transporting or maintaining a 
sample.146  Noting that “documents prepared in the regular course of 
equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial records[,]” the 
court explained that the statements of the volatiles solution preparer were 
not prepared in anticipation of trial and thus were not testimonial.147  
Further, “the prosecution is not required to produce all individuals who laid 
hands on the evidence [i.e., mail carriers and evidence custodians] when 
establishing the chain of custody.”148  Lutz, though, also required the 
prosecution to produce at trial a witness other than the analyst.  In doing so, 
the court relied on the third149 Rule 707 case – State ex rel. Roseland v. 
Herauf150 – which was the most detrimental to prosecutors. 
The defendant in Herauf was arrested for DUI and submitted to a blood 
draw by a nurse.151  The prosecutor gave notice under Rule 707 that he 
 
142. 2012 ND 242, 823 N.W.2d 767. 
143. Rustad, ¶¶ 17, 19, 823 N.W.2d at 773. 
144. Id. ¶ 17. 
145. 2012 ND 156, 820 N.W.2d 111. 
146. Lutz, ¶¶ 7-12, 820 N.W.2d at 117-19. 
147. Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 820 N.W.2d at 117 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 
311 n.1 (2009)).  The court also noted that the prosecution was not intending to introduce the 
statements of the volatiles solution preparer.  Id. ¶ 8, 820 N.W.2d at 117-19. 
148. Id. ¶ 12, 820 N.W.2d at 119 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 
n.1 (2009)).  It is unclear whether Form 104 and the specimen receiver’s statements contained in it 
were challenged.  If so, admission of Form 104 without testimony from the specimen receiver 
likely would violate the defendant’s right to confront.  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 
305, 311 n.1 (2009).  Indeed, the prosecutor could choose to forgo chain-of-custody evidence, but 
“what testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be introduced live.”  Id. 
149. “Third” is meant as the last to be discussed in this Article, not the last in time 
chronologically.  Herauf was actually decided before Lutz and Rustad. 
150. 2012 ND 151, 819 N.W.2d 546. 
151. Herauf, ¶ 2, 819 N.W.2d at 548. 
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intended to introduce at trial the analytical report showing the results from 
testing of the defendant’s blood.152  The defendant responded by sending 
the prosecutor a subpoena to serve upon the nurse who drew the 
defendant’s blood.153  The prosecutor moved to quash the subpoena.154  The 
district court denied the motion and ordered that the prosecutor must 
produce the nurse at trial.155 
The prosecutor then petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for a 
writ directing the district court to withdraw its order.156  The prosecutor 
argued that the plain language of Rule 707 only requires the production of 
witnesses to testify “about the [analytical] report,” which the nurse knew 
nothing about;157 that the nurse was unnecessary for confrontation because 
an officer observed the nurse draw blood and would testify, thereby 
establishing the blood was properly obtained;158 and that even if the officer 
could not establish that the nurse followed the approved method in drawing 
the defendant’s blood, fair administration could be proven through expert 
testimony.159 
In considering the petition, the court160 reasoned that because Rule 707 
references North Dakota Century Code chapter 39-20, it “must be 
interpreted in light of N.D.C.C. § 39-20-07, which governs the admission of 
analytical reports . . . .”161  The court explained that “the legislature 
intertwined analytical reports and blood draws within N.D.C.C. § 39-20-07, 
requiring us to include blood draws, as well as analytical reports, in our 
interpretation of [Rule] 707.”162 
The court then reviewed North Dakota Century Code section 39-20-
07(10), which provides: 
A signed statement from the individual medically qualified to 
draw the blood sample for testing as set forth in subsection 5 is 
 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. ¶ 1. 
157. Brief for Petitioner ¶ 30, State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf, 2012 ND 151, 819 N.W.2d 
546. 
158. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 157, ¶ 31 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 
U.S. 305 (2009); State v. Friedt, 2007 ND 108, ¶¶ 12-13, 735 N.W.2d 848, 853-55). 
159. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 157, ¶ 31 n.2 (quoting State v. Schwalk, 430 N.W.2d 
317, 324 (N.D. 1988)). 
160. The court’s majority included Chief Justice VandeWalle, Justice Kapsner, and Justice 
Maring.  Herauf, ¶ 20, 819 N.W.2d at 555.  Justice Sandtrom concurred and Justice Crothers 
dissented.  Id. ¶¶ 20, 28, 819 N.W.2d at 555, 557. 
161. Id. ¶ 11, 819 N.W.2d at 551. 
162. Id. 
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prima facie evidence that the blood sample was properly drawn 
and no further foundation for the admission of this evidence may 
be required.163 
Citing Schlosser, the court concluded that “under the statute, a prerequisite 
to admission of an analytical report is a signed statement from the 
individual medically qualified to draw the blood sample that the blood 
sample was properly drawn.”164  That conclusion paved the way for the 
court’s ultimate ruling. 
Indeed, if the officer’s testimony about observing the specific method 
followed by the nurse in drawing blood was sufficient to show the blood 
sample was properly drawn, no Sixth Amendment issue would exist.  The 
prosecutor could choose to forgo presenting the nurse’s statement and any 
testimony from her.  But the court’s conclusion ensured that the nurse was 
necessary; the nurse’s signed statement is obviously testimonial.165  And so 
came the court’s ultimate ruling:  Rule 707 requires the prosecutor to 
produce at trial the individual who drew the defendant’s blood if the 
defendant objects and demands that the individual be produced.166  The 
court further announced that “[t]o the extent our previous cases, such as 
Gietzen . . . and Friedt . . . are inconsistent with our holding today, they are 
overruled.”167 
Gietzen and Friedt each had flaws, namely, allowing admission of the 
blood drawing nurse’s statements in Form 104 without testimony from the 
nurse.168  Yet Friedt’s principle that an officer’s testimony could establish – 
based on his personal observations – that a nurse properly obtained blood 
did not need correcting.169  In fact, “correcting” Friedt required 
 
163. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07(10) (Supp. 2011). 
164. Herauf, ¶ 14, 819 N.W.2d at 552 (citing Schlosser v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND 
173, ¶ 9, 775 N.W.2d 695, 698). 
165. Id. ¶ 15, 819 N.W.2d at 553.  The court noted that the Nebraska Supreme Court recently 
ruled that a defendant’s right to confrontation was violated when the certificate of the nurse who 
drew the defendant’s blood was admitted at trial without the nurse’s testimony.  Id. ¶ 17, 819 
N.W.2d at 554-55 (citing State v. Sorenson, 814 N.W.2d 371 (Neb. 2012)).  The court did not cite 
Sorenson for the conclusion that the nurse’s statement is a prerequisite to show that the blood 
sample was properly drawn.  Id. ¶¶ 16-18, 819 N.W.2d at 553-55.  On that point, a key distinction 
exists between Herauf and Sorenson:  In Herauf, the prosecutor had no intent to offer the nurse’s 
statement, while in Sorenson, the prosecutor relied exclusively on the nurse’s certificate.  Brief for 
Petitioner, supra note 157, ¶¶ 30-31; State v. Sorenson, 814 N.W.2d 371, 377 (Neb. 2012)). 
166. Herauf, ¶ 15, 819 N.W.2d at 553 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 
305, 311 (2009); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004)). 
167. Herauf, ¶ 15, 819 N.W.2d at 553 (citing State v. Gietzen, 2010 ND 82, 786 N.W.2d 1; 
State v. Friedt, 2007 ND 108, 735 N.W.2d 848). 
168. State v. Gietzen, 2010 ND 82, ¶¶ 16-18, 786 N.W.2d 1, 5-7; State v. Friedt, 2007 ND 
108, ¶ 13, 735 N.W.2d 848, 855. 
169. An officer testifying about his personal observations does not trigger confrontation 
issues.  See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (showing that the 
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manipulating Schlosser.  As noted in Herauf, the court cited Schlosser to 
support its conclusion that the nurse’s statement is a prerequisite to show a 
blood sample was properly obtained.170  But in Schlosser, the court 
explained that an officer’s testimony can be a sufficient substitute for the 
nurse’s statement.171  Indeed, the court in Schlosser twice recognized that 
an officer’s testimony could “overcome the failure to introduce a complete 
Form 104.”172  And the court actually reviewed the officer’s testimony to 
determine whether it was sufficient to show that the steps in Form 104 were 
followed and, accordingly, that the sample was properly obtained.173  
Simply put, Schlosser established that Form 104 (i.e., a document with a 
nurse’s statement)174 was not a prerequisite to show a blood sample was 
properly obtained.175  Herauf thus recharachterized Schlosser. 
D. COSTS OF AMENDMENT 
Herauf’s recharachterization of Schlosser was costly.  By establishing 
the nurse as a necessary witness, the Rule pits prosecutors against private 
hospitals for a high demand resource:  nurses.  The competition is 
exacerbated by the large number of DUI blood draws.  In 2012, the state 
crime lab in North Dakota will analyze approximately five thousand blood 
samples.176  For each sample, a nurse or other medically qualified 
individual drew blood.177  That means many potential trial subpoenas for 
nurses.  Of course, many DUI cases end in guilty pleas.178  But many of 
those cases first get set for trial, and prosecutors then issue subpoenas for 
 
Confrontation Clause is implicated by testimonial statements not by a witness’s observations of 
another’s conduct). 
170. Herauf, ¶ 11, 819 N.W.2d at 551. 
171. Schlosser v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND 173, ¶ 11, 775 N.W.2d 695, 698-99. 
172. Id. ¶ 11, 775 N.W.2d at 699. 
173. Id. ¶ 3, 775 N.W.2d at 696-97. 
174. Form 104 includes the nurse’s statement.  See supra discussion Part IV.A. 
175. Schlosser, ¶¶ 11-13, 775 N.W.2d at 698-99.  Some argue that even if an officer 
observed the nurse and thus can testify that the nurse followed the approved method in drawing 
blood, the nurse is still needed to establish that she is a nurse (i.e., a person medically qualified to 
draw blood).  Even assuming that the premise is true (that the officer cannot testify that the nurse 
is a nurse), nontestimonial documents certainly could establish the nurse’s occupation.  For 
instance, a hospital business record or roster would not lead someone to reasonably believe “that 
the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 52 (2004). 
176. E-mail from Hope R. Olson, supra note 63.  Crime Lab statistics through December 6, 
2012, showed 4859 blood alcohol cases (categorized as including both “traffic and non-highway 
safety”) were submitted.  Id. 
177. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-02 (Supp. 2011). 
178. It should be noted that some of the five thousand blood draws likely did not result in 
continued DUI prosecution.  For instance, if the test result showed an alcohol concentration below 
.08%, a DUI conviction would be unlikely. 
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nurses.179  When nurses receive subpoenas, employers (hospitals) plan their 
schedules for potential trials. This disrupts hospital business. 
Indeed, within three months of Herauf, Saint Alexius Medical Center 
(SAMC) – a major provider serving Burleigh and Morton Counties – gave 
notice that as of 2013, it will no longer offer blood draw services.180  
SAMC cited the requirement that the prosecution now “produce at trial the 
nurse who drew the blood sample” and the fact that its nurses were 
currently doing fifty blood alcohol draws per month.181  SAMC explained it 
“does not have the ability to adequately staff the ER as required to meet the 
ever increasing needs for quality patient care and responding to court 
appearances required by subpoenas.”182  Sanford Health in Bismarck has 
also advised law enforcement that it will no longer provide blood draw 
services.183  And those advisories have been effective immediately.184 
Other counties are concerned about Sanford and SAMC-like responses.  
In Ward,185 Wells,186 McHenry,187 and Cass188 Counties, prosecutors fear 
that hospitals will opt out of the blood-drawing business.  Understaffed 
hospitals striving for maximum efficiency may simply decide, as SAMC 
and Sanford did, that providing blood drawing services – with the 
accompanying subpoenas and potential court appearances – now 
undermines that goal.189 
Prosecutors have concerns beyond the fear of hospitals choosing not to 
offer blood draw services.  The burden of producing nurses for trial is one 
concern.  While hospitals have been cooperative thus far in Fargo, 
 
179. Interview with Assistant Cass Cnty. State’s Attorney Tristan J. Van de Streek, in Fargo, 
N.D. (Dec. 14, 2012). 
180. Letter from Amy J. Hornbacher, Vice President, Corporate Compliance/Risk 
Management, St. Alexius Medical Ctr., to Burleigh Cnty. State’s Attorney (Oct. 22, 2012) 
[hereinafter Amy J. Hornbacher Burleigh Cnty. Letter] (on file with author); Letter from Amy J. 
Hornbacher, Vice President, Corporate Compliance/Risk Management, St. Alexius Medical Ctr., 
to Ladd Erickson, Mclean Cnty. State’s Attorney (Oct. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Amy J. Hornbacher 
Mclean Cnty. Letter] (on file with author). 
181. Amy J. Hornbacher Burleigh Cnty. Letter, supra note 180. 
182. Id. 
183. Telephone Interview with Sergeant Jason Stugelmeyer, Bismarck Police Dep’t (Dec. 10, 
2012). 
184. Id. 
185. Telephone Interview with Sean B. Kasson, Assistant Ward Cnty. State’s Attorney (Dec. 
10, 2012). 
186. E-mail from Kathleen K. Trosen, Wells Cnty. State’s Attorney to Cherie L. Clark, Asst. 
Cass Cnty. State’s Attorney (Dec. 4, 2012) (on file with author). 
187. Telephone Interview with Marie A. Roller, McHenry Cnty. State’s Attorney (Dec. 11, 
2012). 
188. Interview with Tristan J. Van de Streek, supra note 179.  Cass County is particularly 
concerned because Sanford is one of its two major providers.  Id. 
189. See generally Telephone Interview with Sean  B. Kasson, supra note 185.  A main issue 
in Ward County is understaffing at Trinity Hospital in Minot, N.D.  Id. 
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coordinating nurses to testify at trial has been difficult.190  This is 
sometimes exacerbated by the nature of many DUIs – committed at night 
by drivers who are taken to night-shift blood drawers.191  Others add that 
the “cyclical hiring process and the transitory nature of the workforce,” 
especially in oil-impacted areas, make producing the nurse for trial very 
burdensome.192 
E. OPTIONS TO REDUCE COSTS 
Prosecutors must deal with the costs associated with the existing Rule.  
One option is to seek another amendment of the Rule.  It could be changed 
to eliminate the state’s requirement to produce the nurse for trial.  This 
would allow the prosecutor to prove through a law enforcement officer or 
other witness that a blood sample was properly obtained.  But convincing 
the North Dakota Supreme Court to change the Rule back to a version like 
its original form may be difficult.193 
Another option is to seek amendment of North Dakota Century Code 
section 39-20-07.  Like the Rule, the statute could be changed to eliminate 
the state’s requirement to produce the nurse for trial.  That is because the 
court has construed the Rule in light of the statute.194  Subdivision 10 of the 
statute is the real trigger for the requirement to produce the nurse under the 
Rule.195  As noted, the court has interpreted North Dakota Century Code 
section 39-20-07(10) as establishing the nurse’s statement as a prerequisite 
to admission of the blood test result under chapter 39-20.196  So the statute 
could be changed to explicitly provide (1) that the nurse’s statement is not a 
prerequisite, and (2) that another witness can establish that a blood sample 
was properly drawn.  Then the court’s interpretation would have to change. 
Still another option is for a prosecutor to not use the shortcut procedure 
in North Dakota Century Code section 39-20-07 and thus not be subject to 
Rule 707.197  The Rule applies when a prosecutor intends to introduce an 
 
190. Interview with Tristan J. Van de Streek, supra note 179. 
191. Telephone Interview with Sean B. Kasson, supra note 185. 
192. E-mail from Aaron W. Roseland, Adams Cnty. State’s Attorney to Cherie L. Clark, 
Assistant Cass Cnty. State’s Attorney (Dec. 4, 2012) (on file with author); see also Telephone 
Interview with Marie A. Roller, supra note 187 (indicating that several crimes – including DUI – 
have increased significantly since the oil boom).  Roseland, who was the petitioner in Herauf, 
points to that case as a prime example; the nurse who did the blood draw had moved before trial to 
Texas.  E-mail from Aaron W. Roseland, supra. 
193. See infra discussion Part IV. 
194. State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf, 2012 ND 151, ¶ 11, 819 N.W.2d 546, 551. 
195. See id. 
196. Id. 
197. Some might suggest that law enforcement could just stop seeking blood tests and rely 
on breath tests.  But that does not produce an acceptable outcome.  Blood tests generally are 
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analytical report “issued under . . . N.D.C.C. chapter[] 39-20[.]”198  So 
presumably the prosecutor could forgo serving notice199 under the Rule, 
forgo offering Form 104,200 and choose to simply offer at trial the officer’s 
testimony to establish the authenticity of a blood sample sent for testing and 
an expert’s testimony to establish the accuracy of the blood testing done.  
Indeed, the North Dakota Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that if the 
approved method is not followed, the state can present expert testimony to 
show the test was fairly administered.201  In such instances, the analytical 
report is not “issued202 under” North Dakota Century Code chapter 39-20.  
Nothing in that chapter is relied upon for admission of the report.  Instead, 
general evidentiary rules are followed. 
In addition, an option is to contemplate a process under which private 
hospital nurses are not the persons drawing blood and the prosecutor and 
hospital thus are not competing against each other.  Morton County serves 
as one example.  In Morton County, a registered nurse has an independent 
contract with the county to provide blood draw services.  Similarly, in 
Bismarck, sexual assault nurse examiners on contract with the city have 
been handling blood draws.203  Finally, in Cass County, the sheriff is 
considering a process whereby medically qualified persons – possibly 
 
preferred over breath tests because breath test results are more often challenged by defendants, 
regardless of merit.  Telephone Interview with Sean B. Kasson, supra note 185; Telephone 
Interview with Kristjan Helgoe, Trooper, N.D. State Highway Patrol (Dec. 11, 2012).  Moreover, 
some DUI arrestees are incapable of producing a sufficient breath sample for testing.  E-mail from 
Kathleen K. Trosen, supra note 186. 
198. N.D. R. EVID. 707(a). 
199. If a prosecutor serves notice and the defendant demands production of the nurse, the 
prosecutor should consider withdrawing the notice. 
200. As noted, Form 104 includes statements (testimony) from the nurse and the specimen 
receiver at the state lab. 
201. See City of W. Fargo v. Hawkins, 2000 ND 168, ¶ 17, 616 N.W.2d 856, 860; State v. 
Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d 878, 882 (N.D. 1993); City of Grand Forks v. Soli, 479 N.W.2d 872, 875 
(N.D. 1992); State v. Nodland, 493 N.W.2d 697, 699 (N.D. 1992); State v. Sivesind, 439 N.W.2d 
530, 533 (N.D. 1989); State v. Schwalk, 430 N.W.2d 317, 324 (N.D. 1988); Moser v. N.D. State 
Highway Comm’r, 369 N.W.2d 650, 653 (N.D. 1985). 
202. “Issued” seems to be a misnomer.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 577 (6th ed. 1991) 
(defining “issue” as “[t]o send forth; to emit; to promulgate”).  The analytical report is issued by 
the state crime laboratory’s analyst and is based on the testing completed at the lab.  The 
prosecutor can choose to offer the report under North Dakota Century Code chapter 39-20, but the 
report is not issued under the chapter. 
203. Telephone Interview with Sergeant Jason Stugelmeyer, supra note 183.  This may be a 
temporary fix and could be problematic when there are several DUIs or several DUIs and sexual 
assaults during one period. 
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cross-trained employees204 or independent contractors – would provide 
blood draw services.205 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Melendez-Diaz and its progeny are tricky.206  Justice Kennedy aptly 
explained, “without guidance from an established body of law, the States 
can only guess what future rules this Court will distill from the sparse 
constitutional text [of the Confrontation Clause].”207 
Herauf and its interpretation of Rule 707 exemplify the problems 
stemming from Melendez-Diaz.  When Rule 707 was adopted, no one 
envisioned it as establishing that a blood-drawing nurse is a necessary 
witness in a DUI prosecution.208  And at adoption, it did not do so.209  
Indeed, the originally-adopted rule stemmed from Melendez-Diaz and 
targeted lab analysts.210  “The concept outlined by the United States 
Supreme Court and already practiced in numerous states was to provide 
defendants the ability to assert their right to confront the makers of reports 
that ultimately would be used to implicate them in criminal activity.”211 
Yet the Rule evolved, and now the nurse has become a necessary 
witness.212  As Rule 707 has evolved, so too have DUI prosecutions.  The 
former shortcut (North Dakota Century Code section 39-20-07) has become 
the long way.213  Indeed, the costs of producing nurses for trials are great – 
for both prosecutors and hospitals.214  Beyond seeking statutory or rule 
changes, prosecutors should consider either avoiding the Rule by forgoing 
the “shortcut” procedure under North Dakota Century Code chapter 39-20 
or implementing a process that does not use private hospital employees for 
blood draws.215  The bottom line is that prosecutors must respond. 
 
204. Drawbacks of using cross-trained employees include (1) the significant impact on the 
Sheriff’s operations and (2) the time needed to implement the system.  E-mail from Paul Laney, 
Cass Cnty. Sheriff, to Reid Brady, Assistant Cass Cnty. State’s Attorney (Dec. 10, 2012). 
205. Id. 
206. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 331 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
207. Id. 
208. Order of Adoption No. 20090381, supra note 5. 
209. N.D. R. EVID. 707 (2010). 
210. Order of Adoption No. 20090381, supra note 5. 
211. E-mail from Aaron G. Birst, N.D Ass’n of Cntys, to Cherie L. Clark, Assistant Cass 
Cnty. State’s Attorney (Dec. 10, 2012) (on file with author).  Moreover, the Rule still today 
provides that if the defendant does not timely object, “the defendant’s right to confront the person 
who prepared the report is waived.”  N.D. R. EVID. 707(c). 
212. State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf, 2012 ND 151, ¶ 1, 819 N.W.2d 546, 548. 
213. See discussion supra Part IV.D. 
214. See discussion supra Part IV.D. 
215. See discussion supra Part IV.E. 
